By Bret Stephens
President Trump, I think, feels very much like he’s accomplished a goal. He said Iran would not get nuclear weapons. He took action that appeared to be decisive. So far, the blowback from Iran appears to be really minimal, although it’s still the early days, so this could unfold over a long period of time.
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I’m always reminded of that wonderful line attributed to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, that intelligence must never be mistaken for intelligence.
Look, the Israelis had a very different assessment of the state of Iran’s nuclear program, owing partly, I think, to superior collection methods, which they’ve demonstrated again and again that they have the state of Iran’s nuclear program. Their assessments were that Iran was much closer, that they had been, in fact, working on elements of bomb designs. But I think there’s also a kind of a confusion about the way in which bombs get made and the timetable. It’s not like you pass a finish line, so to speak, like a trinity test in the New Mexico desert.
What happens really is that countries enter into a kind of a nuclear gray zone as they’re developing weapons. They’ve acquired sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium. That’s Part 1 of it. They have developed ballistic missiles, which can deploy or field miniaturized nuclear warheads. And what Iran was doing was sort of very systematically putting together all of those components in a way that didn’t quite provide a clear line, which would say to Western intelligence officials: OK, this is the point of no return. But it was getting incredibly close — uncomfortably close.
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Of course Israel has a dog in the fight, because the Islamic Republic of Iran has been threatening its annihilation, and has been threatening a second Holocaust since it came into power in 1979. So I think it’s quite natural if you’re any Israeli leader, of the left or of the right, that you’re going to take this threat with the utmost seriousness, because this is a regime that states its intentions and then amasses capabilities in order to carry them out. I don’t think we can fault the Israelis for taking this threat seriously.
The reason that we have not had to deal with this previously is because high-quality Israeli intelligence has been succeeding in postponing, delaying or retarding Iran’s nuclear bids for decades. The reason these warnings have not come to fruition is because covert action by Israelis succeeded for a remarkable period of time to consistently postpone Iran’s nuclear bids. Now, it is true that intelligence is sometimes wrong, but I think that the Israelis have demonstrated a capacity for close, remarkable intelligence that I am guessing their counterparts at the C.I.A. could only dream of, in terms of the granularity with which they’ve been able to track down Iranian capabilities and figures that system and harm them.
But the larger point, which Friedrich Merz, the German Chancellor made just the other day, is you don’t build a uranium enrichment facility, 300, 200, 300 meters underground if your intentions are peaceful. You just don’t.
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Iran — a nuclear Iran — is a direct threat to the United States. First of all, if you can lob a missile, say, 1,200 miles, you’re going to sooner or later master the technology to lob a missile 7,000 miles, or whatever it is — whatever the range is of an intercontinental ballistic missile.
Iran is a country that is busy trying to carry out assassinations on American soil, including my friend Masih Alinejad, including our sometimes contributor John Bolton, the former national security adviser of the United States. The Iranians have demonstrated time and again that they’re up for playing dirty tricks at a great distance. But the more important threat, the thing that really should keep American decision makers up at night, is what an Iranian bomb would mean for proliferation in the Middle East. Because if Iran were to acquire a bomb tomorrow, then the Saudis would surely get a bomb either by buying it from the Pakistanis or developing an indigenous capability. The Turks would do it, the Egyptians would do it. Perhaps the Algerians would do it.
And then you have to ask yourself, as a decision maker in Washington: Do you really want five or six nuclear weapon states in the world’s most volatile region, each of them at daggers drawn with one another? All of a sudden, figuring out the kind of nature of deterrence in a region like that becomes really terrifying for American decision makers. So the interest in the United States and preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon isn’t simply that this is the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism in possession of the world’s worst weapons. It’s the chain reaction that it sets off throughout the region.
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I think the choice that confronted the Trump administration wasn’t between Iran with a bomb and Iran with no bomb. It was Iran with a bomb and Iran with hopefully no bomb. And the Iranians were moving into a gray zone where it would’ve become almost impossible to stop them through military means. But we’ve probably retarded their program by some substantial period of time. It’s not easy to reassemble all of the industrial equipment that goes into making nuclear weapons. It’s not easy to find ways to do so in secret now that the Iranian regime knows that it’s been so deeply penetrated by Israeli intelligence, and it’s not easy to do so in the teeth of a president who has now demonstrated that he really is willing to use force if necessary. So my guess is that it’ll actually be many years before Iran can reassemble what it had on the eve of its war with Israel just 12 or whatever, 13, 14 days ago.
Now, does that mean Iran will see the light and realize it needs to invest in economic development rather than squander resources on nuclear capability? I don’t know. But I actually think there’s a better chance of that than people assume. Of course the lesson the Iranians might draw is we should have gotten a nuclear weapon much sooner, and now they’ll be hellbent on acquiring one. It’s possible that all of their national efforts will shift toward that goal, especially if the current leadership is replaced by an I.R.G.C. figure even more extreme and less cautious. That’s totally within the realm of possibility.
But it’s also possible they’ll see that they have invested $500 billion into a wasted effort that brought them nothing but humiliation, and loss of hardware and prestige — and decide to change course. Strategically, they’re in a much worse position now, thanks to Israeli actions in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. Out of national interest — and the interest of preserving the regime — they may choose to recalibrate and seek a different path. And by the way, it’s also possible that six months or a year from now, when the next morality policeman beats and murders an Iranian woman in the streets, setting off demonstrations, the regime, now weaker and more uncertain, may have a harder time suppressing dissent with the same engines of repression it’s relied on in the past. Over time, I think the regime becomes more vulnerable to internal change — and hopefully to positive change.
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When I think of the parade of horribles that we were hearing from people like Tucker Carlson, thousands of Americans dead if the United States were to bomb Fordo, it seems that this — as we’re speaking now — has been an astonishing success: the massive degradation of Iran’s nuclear capabilities in a swift period of time, at no cost so far to American lives and with the Iranians very swiftly signaling that they want to back down both vis-à-vis the United States and also with the Israelis. I’m a great believer in Winston Churchill’s phrase “in victory, magnanimity.” And I think a lot will depend on how the United States proceeds diplomatically from here.
One of the things I’ve suggested for the Trump administration — I wrote this in a column just last week — is essentially to first bomb Fordo, and of course Natanz and Isfahan. But then offer the following deal, which I think would be very useful, even if the Iranians reject it: In exchange for Iran verifiably abandoning its enrichment programs and its nuclear programs, and ending support for proxies like Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas, that the United States would lift all economic sanctions. We should find ways to entice the Iranian regime with proverbial offers that no sane country can refuse — to see if we can turn a new leaf.
But, you know, as Niels Bohr or Yogi Berra or someone said: Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future. So I don’t want to discount anything of how this might affect the regime going forward. It’s an open and interesting — and in many ways, of course, terrifying question.
I think for the Israelis, the sense was that they had to strike before Iran had acquired sufficient quantities of uranium enriched to a 90 percent level, which is what’s broadly considered weapons-grade uranium. They’d gotten to 60 percent, which is very, very close. So from that point of view, it seemed that the urgency — at least from the Israeli perspective — was there.
There was also an opportunity for the Israelis because they had previously substantially degraded Iran’s anti-air capability. So they had a moment of opportunity — an opening. And the question that ultimately needs to be raised isn’t whether Israel waited until the last possible minute or the next to last possible minute. The real question about urgency is just how serious a threat should we see an Iran with a nuclear capability. Not only to Israel’s interest or Middle Eastern interest, but to core American interest. I think the answer is it was an urgent, pressing threat, and there was an opportunity to do something about it. And Israel sees that opportunity, and Donald Trump followed up with what I hope was a decisive blow.