The New Iran Bill: Better, But Still Risky. Obama Has No Choice But to Accept It.

GREG SARGENT, WASHINGTON POST


Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) and Senator Ben Cardin (D-Md.), the leaders on the Foreign Relations Committee, have announced a compromise recasting the Corker-Menendez bill to deal with objections from Senate Democrats. The compromise is an improvement, but it still poses a risk to a final deal with Iran.

The Huffington Post outlines the new Corker-Menendez bill’s key provisions. Here’s the gist:

1) Obama still must submit the final deal to Congress, but the period during which Obama is restricted from lifting sanctions to implement the deal has been cut in half, from 60 days to 30 days. During that period, Congress may vote to approve or disapprove of the final deal. After that, the president has 12 days to veto the bill; and if he does; Congress has another 10 days to override that veto.

Still, as a practical matter, this bill is no more likely to actually stop the deal with Iran than the original version. Under either version, Congress could pass a resolution rejecting the Iran agreement, but Mr. Obama could veto it, meaning he needs to hold onto no more than 34 senators or 146 House members to prevent an override.

Mr. Obama frames it as a nonbinding executive agreement rather than a treaty that would require Senate approval; most agreements with foreign countries in recent decades have been negotiated similarly. But lawmakers argue that this one is too important to go through without their involvement.

resident Obama told female bloggers on Wednesday that he had fewer options left for using his power to bypass Congress. Credit Stephen Crowley/The New York Times

2) Under the new framework, the president would certify to Congress every 90 days that Iran is complying with the final deal, but he would no longer have to certify that Iran had not directly supported a terrorist attack targeting an American or American business.

That’s also an improvement. Critics had feared this would introduce another condition that could scuttle a final deal after it is reached and being implemented, even though it is unrelated to Iran’s nuclear program. This also could have caused Iran to walk before a deal was reached.

3) The new framework still preserves the ultimate approve/disapprove Congressional vote on the deal itself, i.e., the vote on whether the president has the authority to temporarily lift sanctions to implement a final deal. (The permanent lifting of sanctions would also require a Congressional vote later, but Congress would probably want to wait on that vote, anyway, to see if Iran is complying.)

The big question is whether this last provision will derail the process before a final deal can be reached.

First, let’s understand what the risk really is here. The problem isn’t necessarily that Congress could end up voting down a deal later. It’s perfectly possible that many Democrats who support Corker-Menendez could ultimately support a final deal. Indeed, that might be easier for them to do after they’ve proved their “toughness” by backing Corker-Menendez. Under this framework, if Congress disapproves of the final deal, restricting Obama’s authority to lift sanctions, and Obama vetoes that, but Congress fails to override that veto, the deal goes forward in the short term anyway. That’s because under this framework, not passing a restriction of Obama’s authority to lift the sanctions is the equivalent of approving that authority. It’s very hard to imagine Democrats — even ones who support Corker-Menendez — helping to override a veto and killing a final deal after it has been reached.

So Corker-Menendez could very well become law, and Congress could still subsequently fail to scuttle a final deal (if it is reached).

Rather, the danger is that a vote now on Corker-Menendez could scuttle the process before a deal is finalized, by sowing fears that Congress ultimately will not allow the president to keep up his end of the bargain. Senator Tim Kaine, a leading supporter of Corker-Menendez who by all appearances really wants a final deal to work, assures us that this isn’t going to happen. He says Iran understands the process here and gets the endgame laid out in the above paragraphs. However, no Corker-Menendez backer has convincingly explained why this vote has to happen now. All of this could almost certainly be structured so Congress could hold its initial vote to create the Corker-Menendez framework on the day the deal is signed, and the outcome from there on out would be procedurally identical.

So the question is, Why risk scuttling the whole process with a vote before a deal is signed, when all the same procedural benefits of Corker-Menendez — including Congressional oversight of the process — could be obtained with a vote later? I still haven’t heard a good answer to that.

Today the White House confirmed that the president will probably sign the new version of Corker-Menendez, provided it doesn’t get worsened by the amendment process, in which Republicans may try to insert additional provisions toughening the conditions on a final deal.

My strong suspicion is that the White House accepted the new framework because it has no choice. Democrats had already predicted that the new Corker-Menendez framework would secure a veto-proof majority. Whether that’s true or not, Congress is going to vote on a final deal one way or the other, so the White House is probably accepting this framework as its best bet.

THE IRAN DEAL: BREAKOUTS AND FEARS

JESSICA MATHEWS, NY REVIEW OF BOOKS


It is too soon to comment in detail about the elements of the agreement, especially about its all-important inspections, monitoring, and verification provisions, but two particularly vexing issues deserve attention.

Breakout time is often considered the measure of an acceptable agreement. It is not, as so often portrayed, the time required to build a bomb. It is defined only as the time needed to accumulate enough highly enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon, and it is an estimate, based on a number of assumptions. This accounts, in part, for differences in the numbers being quarreled about. The difference between the two to three months that Iran would need today and the twelve months that Iran would need under the agreement is highly significant. The difference between ten months and twelve months is meaningless.

More to the point is what comes next. After accumulating the fuel, a country has to make the actual weapon and then, presumably, test it. That, of course, means enough fuel for two weapons, not one. But the military value of a single nuclear weapon is close to zero. Indeed, if that weapon provokes a weaker adversary—Saudi Arabia, in Iran’s case—to acquire nuclear weapons of its own, the net result is not an asset but a tremendous liability.

For Iran to acquire a nuclear arsenal useful against Israel would require an enormous, highly visible, and easily detected effort over years.

Breakout time is, in short, a useful measure but far from being the single important one. With appropriate restrictions on the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium and tight inspections and monitoring, far less than twelve months would actually be needed to detect and respond to an attempt by Iran to race for a weapon.

The second issue is the matter of when and to what degree Iran will reveal what it actually did in the past in pursuing a nuclear weapon. The IAEA has had a long list of questions about these activities that Iran has refused to answer for years. The US summary of the agreement says only that Iran “will implement an agreed set of measures” to address these concerns about past actions, suggesting that this issue, too, has not yet been agreed on.

Legitimate and highly emotional questions will be raised on this matter. My guess is that it will prove to be a continuing stumbling block for negotiations. To clear up the questions, Iran would have to admit to violating its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty it signed in 1970. Nations—all nations—hate to admit such error. Iran’s case will be even more difficult because of the fatwa issued by the Supreme Leader declaring nuclear weapons to be a violation of the principles of the Islamic Republic.

 [WASHINGTON POST  Charles Krauthammer:    Veteran nuclear expert David Albright  points out, that makes future verification impossible — how can you determine what’s been illegally changed or added if you have no baseline? Worse, there’s been no mention of the only verification regime with real teeth — at-will, unannounced visits to any facility, declared or undeclared. The joint European-Iranian statement spoke only of “enhanced access through agreed procedures,” which doesn’t remotely suggest anywhere/anytime inspections. And on Thursday, Iran’s supreme leader ruled out any “extraordinary supervision measures.”
    Yet even if violations are found, what then? First, they have to be certified by the IAEA. Which then reports to the United Nations, where Iran has the right to challenge the charge. Which then has to be considered, argued and adjudicated. Which then presumably goes to the Security Council where China, Russia and sundry anti-Western countries will act as Iran’s lawyers. Which all would take months — after which there is no guarantee that China and Russia will ratify the finding anyway.
As for the “snapback” sanctions — our last remaining bit of pressure — they are equally fantastic. There’s no way sanctions will be re-imposed once they have been lifted. It took a decade to weave China, Russia and the Europeans into the current sanctions infrastructure. Once gone, it doesn’t snap back. None will pull their companies out of a thriving, post-sanctions Iran. As Kissinger and Shultz point out, we will be fought every step of the way, leaving the United States, not Iran, isolated.  ]

The most significant objection, not to this agreement but to any agreement, is the one that primarily fuels Israel’s efforts to prevent a deal. It is the fear that an agreement will lead to Iran rejoining the international community, to warming relations between Tehran and Washington, and to a change in the familiar alignment of nations in the Middle East. These are valid fears.

For most countries in the world, resolving the nuclear issue will mean that normal relations with Iran will soon follow. This was inevitable: Iran would not stay a pariah nation forever. And while more normal relations with the international community may or may not lead to less aggressive policies and less support for terrorism on Tehran’s part, continued outsider status is unlikely to change its behavior. With sanctions lifted, Iran will have much more money to spend—some of it for destructive purposes. That, too, is a price of an agreement.

On the other hand, the concern that the United States will return to the days of the Shah, closely aligning itself with Iran, is overblown. As the prospect of an agreement has neared, opponents have pushed this fear so far to the fore that they argue that the change they dread has already occurred. According to the Republican commentator Michael Gerson, “evidence for an evolving administration attitude toward Iran has been on display” in both Syria and Iraq. Republicans “sense a major shift in American policy—a desire to cozy up with Iran.” But the temporary convergence of American and Iranian interests in defeating ISIS in Iraq would exist whether nuclear talks were underway or not. Similarly, Washington’s prolonged indecision and its refusal to intervene militarily in Syria’s four-year-old conflict without a political solution in sight long predates the opening with Iran. The same is true for the burgeoning war in Yemen, where Washington chooses not to intervene militarily for compelling local reasons, not because Iran is backing the Houthi rebels.

It is impossible to predict whether a nuclear agreement will lead to better relations between the US and Iran in the near term. Hard-liners in both countries may respond by ratcheting up tensions on many other issues. Eventually, though, removing the absolute block to normal relations caused by Iran’s nuclear program would open the possibility of beginning to address the many other issues that divide Washington and Tehran. If that happens, it can only be to the good, but there is no reason to believe that the US will carelessly abandon its manifold objections to Iranian policies.

Nervousness on the part of the Sunni nations, particularly the Gulf States, is inevitable. Some of them can hardly decide whether they fear a nuclear deal more or less than a nuclear Iran. So far, the administration has shown care in addressing their concerns. The timing of the announcement that the US would resume arms sales to Egypt was not unrelated to the nuclear talks.



The weeks ahead are of enormous consequence to US national security, not only with respect to Iran, but to our long-term ability to frame and execute a coherent foreign policy not determined solely by partisan motives. If Congress takes steps to reject the nuclear deal before it is completed, or if it undermines US negotiators by raising further doubts in Tehran that Washington will ever meet its commitments to lift sanctions, it will have done significant long-term damage to US power in ways that no amount of military strength can offset. The US ability to lead, to shape international relations, and to influence other countries’ decisions depends on its stature. A country that follows one policy through several presidencies with bipartisan support and then suddenly reverses course midstream will be diminished. A country that cannot speak abroad with a single voice will not command the respect the US expects and needs.

If a final deal can ultimately be negotiated, Congress will have a major part to play when it must decide whether Iran’s behavior merits lifting legislative sanctions. Long before that, Congress should have a full opportunity to assess the agreement, which can only be done after negotiations are completed. Chairman Corker should underline the leadership position he took in not signing the Cotton letter by postponing a vote on this bill until early July and adjusting its language accordingly. Later, Congress’s oversight of the deal’s implementation should be robust. Optimally, a special body can be created to receive frequent, highly classified briefings and to travel to Iran to judge for itself whether the agreement’s terms are being fully met.

Those who worry that a deal with Iran will entail some risk should remember that preventing nuclear proliferation almost never happens in a single leap. Countries change direction slowly. International rules and norms are built up brick by brick over years. Technical capacities to monitor and political expectations are gradually but steadily strengthened. The agreement with Iran, if one is finally reached, will not be the end, but a beginning. It must be strong and carefully framed and minutely monitored, but it need not be watertight in order for it to ultimately open the way to a permanently nonnuclear Iran.

—April 6, 2015