September 16, 2014

Obama’s strategy to fight Isis cedes too much control






THE GUARDIAN

By addressing the political and presentational aspects of the use of force in advance of military operations, President Obama has signalled a shift in American foreign policy culture, at least in the design of his strategy. In terms of delivery too he has indicated a greater emphasis on CIA-led counterterrorism operations compared with US military-led counterinsurgency operations. But almost every element is fraught with risk and, because he has subcontracted more to other nations than previous US presidents, he has less control over outcomes.

The timing of the speech, just two days after the announcement of a new Iraqi government, is no coincidence. It is evidence of intense behind-the-scenes diplomatic activity to ensure that the Maliki regime’s parochial Shia domination does not recreate the conditions that led to the crisis. There is, however, no indication that the new government will be able to unite a country whose identity faultlines are now fractured beyond repair. If that government fails then in a decade or so, the grievances that led to the rise of Islamic State (Isis) may breed another virulent rebellion.
The decision to involve regional, mostly Arab, countries in the conflict represents the most immature and risky part of the US strategy. Middle Eastern countries have spent billions on their defence capability but have shown a remarkable reluctance to deploy it beyond quelling mostly unarmed civilian rebellions. A history of petty squabbling and so little experience of political cooperation or joint military operations further reduces their potential impact. If the anti-Iranian attitude of the Saudis and other Gulf states is not checked before any troops from those countries arrive in Iraq then there is a danger of sparks flying if they come into contact with the Iranian military “advisers”, who appear to be advising very close to the frontline.
Increasing efforts to remove President Assad from power in Syria is probably the greatest strategic flaw. Identification and maintenance of a single clear aim is a maxim of strategic success. If defeating Isis is the main aim of this strategy then why complicate an already difficult task by simultaneously engineering regime change in Syria? It seems that US foreign policy has still to evolve through a realisation that the only thing worse than the tyranny of dictators is the anarchy that succeeds them, as illustrated by the removal of Saddam and Gaddafi.
In terms of delivery, too, the strategy has risks. Integration of air and land forces is a highly skilled task that even western forces struggle with. As the British discovered in Afghanistan, delivering air support to ground troops under fire in a timely and accurate fashion is not always possible, prompting one British army major to describe his air force as “utterly, utterly useless”. If the Iraqi, Iranian and Arab forces on the ground do not understand these difficulties then any delays or failures in US air support may be interpreted as a western ploy to permit losses to those forces.
President Obama’s primary objective of “degrading and destroying” Isis is to be achieved through counterterrorism operations where the CIA has a lead. This is the one element of strategy where the US has full control and a formidable track record of success. However, it is also one that is most full of pitfalls. It is no accident that Obama only mentioned Somalia and Yemen as examples where that strategy has been employed with success against al-Qaida instead of the Afghanistan and Pakistan tribal belt where its leadership and operational capability were mostly destroyed. A considerable number of civilian deaths occurred from the drone strikes there, resulting in a huge political backlash in the region with continuing insecurity and the emergence of a militant anti-western movement. Unless there is an improvement in intelligence and greater restraint in the use of drones, there is a danger that each successful attack on Isis could generate new recruits radicalised by the deaths of innocents.