Showing posts with label OBAMA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label OBAMA. Show all posts

July 16, 2015

IN GREECE AND IRAN, OUTCOMES AND ATTEMPTS AT RECONCILIATION.

Greek MP's during the tense debate.


Greece Gives A Bitter Consent

THE GUARDIAN

In Greece, lawmakers approved a package of harsh austerity measures and economic policy changes that were required by its creditors as the terms of a $94 billion bailout package.Tsipras faced a revolt over the reforms from his radical-left ruling Syriza party, which came to power in January on anti-austerity promises. But the Athens parliament eventually carried the bill on Wednesday night by 229 lawmakers in favour, 64 against and six abstentions.

In a vote that saw tensions soar in and outside parliament, Syriza suffered huge losses as 40 MPs revolted against the measures, but pro-European opposition parties delivered their support. The outcome will significantly weaken Tsipras as the scale of the rebellion sinks in. Stripped of its working majority, the Syriza-dominated two-party coalition will struggle to enforce the pension cuts and VAT increases outlined in the deal or implement any other legislation outside it.

Still, there was relief that the Greek parliament had overwhelmingly supported reforms to ensure that talks on a third bailout for the debt-stricken country can begin.



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U.S. Offers to Help Israel Bolster Defenses,

NY TIMES

When President Obama called Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Tuesday to discuss the nuclear deal with Iran, the American president offered the Israeli leader, who had just deemed the agreement a “historic mistake,” a consolation prize: a fattening of the already generous military aid package the United States gives Israel.

The nuclear agreement, which would lift sanctions on Iran in exchange for restrictions designed to prevent it from developing a nuclear weapon, would ultimately provide a financial windfall to Israel’s sworn enemy in the region, and Mr. Obama said he was prepared to hold “intensive discussions” with Mr. Netanyahu on what more could be done to bolster Israel’s defenses, administration officials said.

But, as in previous talks with Mr. Obama, Mr. Netanyahu refused to engage in such talk “at this juncture,” the officials said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to detail the private discussions. And on Tuesday, as administration officials fanned out to make the case for the Iran agreement, one aide suggested in a phone call to Jewish and pro-Israel groups that Mr. Netanyahu had rebuffed their overtures because he believes accepting them now would be tantamount to blessing the nuclear deal, say people involved in the call who did not want to be quoted by name in describing it.

The president himself has hinted that he believes the Israeli prime minister is loath to talk about any additional security assistance he may want from the United States until after Congress has had its say on the Iran deal. Lawmakers have 60 days to review the deal, which Mr. Netanyahu has urged them to reject.

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No Time Like The Right Time...

NY TIMES

 One by one, the roadblocks to a nuclear accord between Iran and the United States had been painstakingly cleared.

For the Iranians, this was a negotiation first and foremost to get rid of what Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister and his country’s chief negotiator, often called the “unjust sanctions” while trying to keep their nuclear options open. And while they treasured their nuclear program, they treasured the symbolism of not backing down to American demands even more. But Mr. Zarif was walking his own high-wire act at home. While he had an important ally in Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani, hard-liners did not want to reach any deal at all; many were making a fortune from the sanctions because they controlled Iran’s black markets.

And conservatives around the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, were looking for any signs that their Americanized chief negotiator, who studied at the University of Denver, was ready to give away too much nuclear infrastructure without getting Iran the sanctions lifted in return, as the ayatollah had decreed.

There was no single event, no heart-to-heart conversation between adversaries or game-changing insight that made the Iran deal happen. Instead, over a period of years, each side came to gradually understand what mattered most to the other.

For the Americans, that meant designing offers that kept the shell of Iran’s nuclear program in place while seeking to gut its interior. For the Iranians, it meant ridding themselves of sanctions in ways they could describe to their own people as forcing the United States to deal with Iran as an equal, respected sovereign power. And it happened because a brief constellation of personalities and events came into alignment:



The top energy officials of the United States and Iran, respectively, were Ernest J. Moniz and Ali Akbar Salehi. Mr. Moniz and Mr. Salehi, a former foreign minister and now head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, joined the talks to work out the nuclear details — in a less political, more scientific environment.

The officials working under Mr. Salehi “were mostly hard-liners, and they would give on nothing,” one American official said. But when Mr. Salehi, who got his nuclear training at M.I.T. before the Iranian revolution, showed up and developed a rapport with Mr. Moniz, the secretary of energy and a former chairman of the M.I.T. physics department, the Iranian bureaucrats were often sidelined, or overruled.

During a break on one particularly discouraging March day in Lausanne, Switzerland, where negotiations were held before adjourning to Vienna, Mr. Zarif struck a different tone as he invoked the names of the key figures on two sides, including Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and the top energy officials of the United States and Iran, Ernest J. Moniz and Ali Akbar Salehi.

“We are not going to have another time in history when there is an Obama and a Biden and a Kerry and a Moniz again,” Mr. Zarif said, according to notes of the conversation. “And there may be no Rouhani, Zarif and Salehi.”


Hassan Rouhani was allowed to run for president in 2013 largely on a platform of ridding Iran of punishing sanctions. Credit Ivan Sekretarev/Associated Press

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When the photo ops were over, the seven foreign ministers who had negotiated it met for the last time. Each spoke briefly about the importance of the moment. Mr. Kerry spoke last, but then added a personal coda. Choking up, he recalled going off to Vietnam as a young naval officer and said he never wanted to go through that again. He emerged committed, he said, to using diplomacy to avoid the horrors of war.

April 14, 2015

The New Iran Bill: Better, But Still Risky. Obama Has No Choice But to Accept It.




GREG SARGENT, WASHINGTON POST


Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) and Senator Ben Cardin (D-Md.), the leaders on the Foreign Relations Committee, have announced a compromise recasting the Corker-Menendez bill to deal with objections from Senate Democrats. The compromise is an improvement, but it still poses a risk to a final deal with Iran.

The Huffington Post outlines the new Corker-Menendez bill’s key provisions. Here’s the gist:

1) Obama still must submit the final deal to Congress, but the period during which Obama is restricted from lifting sanctions to implement the deal has been cut in half, from 60 days to 30 days. During that period, Congress may vote to approve or disapprove of the final deal. After that, the president has 12 days to veto the bill; and if he does; Congress has another 10 days to override that veto.

Still, as a practical matter, this bill is no more likely to actually stop the deal with Iran than the original version. Under either version, Congress could pass a resolution rejecting the Iran agreement, but Mr. Obama could veto it, meaning he needs to hold onto no more than 34 senators or 146 House members to prevent an override.

Mr. Obama frames it as a nonbinding executive agreement rather than a treaty that would require Senate approval; most agreements with foreign countries in recent decades have been negotiated similarly. But lawmakers argue that this one is too important to go through without their involvement.


resident Obama told female bloggers on Wednesday that he had fewer options left for using his power to bypass Congress. Credit Stephen Crowley/The New York Times


2) Under the new framework, the president would certify to Congress every 90 days that Iran is complying with the final deal, but he would no longer have to certify that Iran had not directly supported a terrorist attack targeting an American or American business.

That’s also an improvement. Critics had feared this would introduce another condition that could scuttle a final deal after it is reached and being implemented, even though it is unrelated to Iran’s nuclear program. This also could have caused Iran to walk before a deal was reached.

3) The new framework still preserves the ultimate approve/disapprove Congressional vote on the deal itself, i.e., the vote on whether the president has the authority to temporarily lift sanctions to implement a final deal. (The permanent lifting of sanctions would also require a Congressional vote later, but Congress would probably want to wait on that vote, anyway, to see if Iran is complying.)

The big question is whether this last provision will derail the process before a final deal can be reached.

First, let’s understand what the risk really is here. The problem isn’t necessarily that Congress could end up voting down a deal later. It’s perfectly possible that many Democrats who support Corker-Menendez could ultimately support a final deal. Indeed, that might be easier for them to do after they’ve proved their “toughness” by backing Corker-Menendez. Under this framework, if Congress disapproves of the final deal, restricting Obama’s authority to lift sanctions, and Obama vetoes that, but Congress fails to override that veto, the deal goes forward in the short term anyway. That’s because under this framework, not passing a restriction of Obama’s authority to lift the sanctions is the equivalent of approving that authority. It’s very hard to imagine Democrats — even ones who support Corker-Menendez — helping to override a veto and killing a final deal after it has been reached.

So Corker-Menendez could very well become law, and Congress could still subsequently fail to scuttle a final deal (if it is reached).

Rather, the danger is that a vote now on Corker-Menendez could scuttle the process before a deal is finalized, by sowing fears that Congress ultimately will not allow the president to keep up his end of the bargain. Senator Tim Kaine, a leading supporter of Corker-Menendez who by all appearances really wants a final deal to work, assures us that this isn’t going to happen. He says Iran understands the process here and gets the endgame laid out in the above paragraphs. However, no Corker-Menendez backer has convincingly explained why this vote has to happen now. All of this could almost certainly be structured so Congress could hold its initial vote to create the Corker-Menendez framework on the day the deal is signed, and the outcome from there on out would be procedurally identical.

So the question is, Why risk scuttling the whole process with a vote before a deal is signed, when all the same procedural benefits of Corker-Menendez — including Congressional oversight of the process — could be obtained with a vote later? I still haven’t heard a good answer to that.

Today the White House confirmed that the president will probably sign the new version of Corker-Menendez, provided it doesn’t get worsened by the amendment process, in which Republicans may try to insert additional provisions toughening the conditions on a final deal.

My strong suspicion is that the White House accepted the new framework because it has no choice. Democrats had already predicted that the new Corker-Menendez framework would secure a veto-proof majority. Whether that’s true or not, Congress is going to vote on a final deal one way or the other, so the White House is probably accepting this framework as its best bet.

April 12, 2015

Congress Can Still Mess Up the Iran Deal


U.S. Senator Bob Corker (R-TN) talks to reporters as he arrives for the weekly Republican caucus policy luncheons at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, March 10, 2015.  REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst    (UNITED STATES - Tags: POLITICS) - RTR4STL3
Senator Bob Corker  {Jonathan Ernst/Reuters }



MICHAEL TOMASKY, DAILY BEAST

“Now, Congress takes up the matter” are words that are ensured to send shudders down the spine, so shudder away: We’ve just entered the congressional phase of the Iran talks, with a Senate hearing next Tuesday, after which it’s up to Mitch McConnell to decide how fast and aggressively to move with the bill from Tennessee Republican Bob Corker that would bar the administration from making any changes to U.S. sanctions against Iran for 60 days while Congress reviews and debates any Iran agreement.

There are, as the Dude said, man, a lotta ins, a lotta outs, a lotta what-have-yous here. It’s all quite complicated. But here, it seems to me, is your cut-to-the-chase question: Is there enough good faith in this United States Senate for something to be worked out? Or is it just impossible?

One proceeds from the assumption that the Senate will do whatever it can to kill a deal. It’s a Republican Senate, by a pretty wide margin (54-46); history would suggest that these Republicans simply aren’t going to hand President Obama a win like this. It hardly matters what the details are, about what Iran can or can’t do at Fordow, about the “snapback” provisions of the sanctions, about the inspections regime, or about what precise oversight role Congress has. It’s just basically impossible to imagine that this Republican Party, after everything we’ve seen over these last six years, and this Republican Senate majority leader, who once said it was his job to make Obama a one-term president, won’t throw up every roadblock to a deal they can conjure.

Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has unwisely lobbied for state to defy President Obama’s clean energy policies. He is the senior senator for Kentucky, a coal state. Photo: Molly Riley /Associated Press / FR170882 AP

Once again, we’re left separating out the factors the way scientists reduce compounds to their constituent elements in the lab. How much of this is just Obama hatred? How much is (this is a slightly different thing) the conviction—quite insane, but firmly held—that he doesn’t have the best interests of the United States at heart? How much is a genuinely paranoid, McCarthy-ish world view about the intractably evil nature of our enemy and the definitional Chamberlainism of ever thinking otherwise?

And how much is just self-interested politics, as it is bequeathed to us in its current form? Which is to say—if you are a Republican senator, you simply cannot cast a vote that can be seen as “pro-Obama” under any circumstances. You just can’t do it.

I asked in a column last week whether there would be one Republican officeholder in Washington who might say, “Hey, upon examination of the details, this looks like a decent deal with risks that are acceptable, and I’m going to support it?” It’s still a good question.

Some suggest Corker himself. Corker has this reputation, in part earned, as one of the reasonable ones. He gets articles written about him like this one,  from The New York Times a couple of days ago, which limned him as a Republican of the old school, a sensible fellow who still wants to horse-trade.

And he is—but only up to a point, at which the horses return to their stalls. The most notable example here is the Dodd-Frank bill. This is all detailed at great and exacting length by Robert Kaiser in his excellent book about how financial reform became law, Act of Congress. Then, Corker talked for hours and hours with Chris Dodd about the particulars—derivatives reform, oversight of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, more. He wanted to play ball, even thought he might deliver some votes. But as time passed, it became clear to Corker that the base just wasn’t standing for it. He faced reelection in 2012. Not tough reelection—he won with 64 percent of the vote. But reelection campaigns are great excuses for senators to do nothing, and nothing is what Corker did. He withdrew from all participation with Dodd and Frank, and he ultimately voted against the bill.  When it mattered, he caved to the extremists, in other words, among his colleagues and in his base. Why that means he should be getting credit for a spirit of compromise now in New York Times articles is something that, to my obtuse mind, requires further explanation.


Senator Tim Kaine

Happily, though, all is not lost. It’s far from clear that [Rebooblicans] can block a deal. There are, I’m told, three categories of senators on this question. The first is our own mullahs—no deal no how. The second is a group of mostly Democrats and independents—Virginia’s Tim Kaine, who is a close ally of the White House, and Maine’s Angus King—who basically want a deal but want to be sure that it’s good, and want to influence the shape of any legislation the Senate might pass.

The third group is senators who also basically would like to see a deal but want the Senate to serve as a backstop against a deal they see as bad. I’d put Chuck Schumer in that third camp. So when these people say they back the Corker bill, as Schumer did this week, it doesn’t mean they’re against the administration or a deal per se. Democrats aren’t going to be Obama’s problem here. A few, the ones from the deep red states, may be boxed in. But most will stick with the administration, if a deal is finalized along current terms.




I don’t think our mullahs have the numbers right now. [They need a 2/3 majority to override a presidential veto. But Obama is going to have to sell this to more parties than [being interviewed by Tom Friedman and Steve Inskeep of NPR]. He has, or should have, Friedman’s readers and Inskeep’s listeners already. The way to get someone like Corker to play ball is to sell it in Knoxville. Public opinion still influences foreign policy, as Obama knows from his Syrian experiences. Put it to work.

April 3, 2015

Iran Agrees to Detailed Nuclear Outline, First Step Toward a Wider Deal


Federica Mogherini, left, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif of Iran announced the details of the agreement.
By Associated Press on Publish Date April 2, 2015. Photo by Fabrice Coffrini/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images.
                            

NY TIMES

 Iran and the United States, along with five other world powers, announced on Thursday a surprisingly specific and comprehensive understanding on limiting Tehran’s nuclear program for the next 15 years, though they left several specific issues to a final agreement in June.

After two years of negotiations, capped by eight tumultuous days and nights of talks that appeared on the brink of breakdown several times, Secretary of State John Kerry and his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, announced the plan, which, if carried out, would keep Iran’s nuclear facilities open under strict production limits, and which holds the potential of reordering America’s relationship with a country that has been an avowed adversary for 35 years.

Mr. Kerry and Energy Secretary Ernest J. Moniz, a nuclear scientist who played a crucial role in the last stages of the negotiations, said the pact satisfied their primary goal of ensuring that Iran, if it decided to, could not race for a nuclear weapon in less than a year, although those constraints against “breakout” would be in effect only for the first decade of the accord.

From left, the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini;  Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister;  British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond; and Secretary of State John Kerry at a news conference on Thursday in Lausanne, Switzerland. Credit Jean-Christophe Bott/Keystone, via Associated Press

Under the accord, Iran agreed to cut the number of operating centrifuges it has by two-thirds, to 5,060, all of them first-generation, and to cut its current stockpile of low-enriched uranium from around 10,000 kilograms to 300 for 15 years. An American description of the deal also referred to inspections “anywhere in the country” that could “investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility.” But in a briefing, American officials talked about setting up a mechanism to resolve disputes that has not been explained in any detail.

In a move not seen since before the Iranian revolution in 1979, and to the surprise of many in both countries, Iranian government broadcasters aired Mr. Obama’s comments live. In parts of Tehran, people cheered and honked car horns as they began to contemplate a life without sanctions on oil and financial transactions, though the issue of when the sanctions are to be removed looms as one of the potential obstacles to a final agreement on June 30.

Mr. Zarif was careful to play down the notion that anything agreed to here would remake the Iran--U.S. relationship. Any hint of a broader rapprochement is an enormously sensitive issue among hard-liners in the Iranian military and clerical leaders who have made opposition to the United States the centerpiece of their political narratives.

“Iran-U.S. relations have nothing to do with this,” Mr. Zarif said emphatically at a university here, where the agreement was announced. “This was an attempt to resolve the nuclear issue.” While saying he hoped the two countries would find a way to melt away their distrust as the agreement was carried out, he hastened to add, “We have serious differences with the United States.”



Now, attention will shift to Mr. Obama and Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian president, who was elected on a platform of ending sanctions. They share a common task: selling the agreement at home to constituencies deeply suspicious of both the deal and the prospect of signing any accord with an avowed enemy. The White House has promised a lobbying campaign by the president unlike any seen since he pushed through health care legislation.

Mr. Zarif and other Iranian officials may have an even harder political argument to win. They will have to overcome objections in the military and scientific establishments, especially because the accord will force them to cut the number of centrifuges enriching uranium by half, put thousands of others in storage and convert two other facilities into research sites that would have virtually no fissile material — the makings of an atom bomb. Iran has insisted that its nuclear program is for civilian uses only.

Mr. Zarif seemed to sense the scope of the challenge in how he framed the agreement. He focused on the fact that Iran would not have to dismantle any facilities — something Washington had initially demanded, especially after helping expose one such secret facility, called Fordo, in Mr. Obama’s first year in office. Mr. Zarif also claimed sanctions would have to be lifted far earlier than one might think listening to Mr. Kerry, saying that, in essence, all the economic sanctions would be lifted once a final agreement was signed. Washington has insisted that the sanctions be removed in a step-by-step manner as Iran fulfills its obligations under the agreement.

Another problem for Mr. Zarif is that the deal he has agreed to is far more restrictive than one he outlined last July in an interview with The New York Times. What he agreed to in Lausanne, at least according to fact sheets published by Washington., would drastically cut Iran’s capability for 10 years and then allow it to build up gradually for the next five.

After that, Iran would be free to produce as much uranium as it wishes — even building the 190,000 centrifuges that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei talked about last summer. That is bound to be a major concern for Congress, the Israelis and the Arab states, because it amounts to a bet that after 15 years, Iran will be a far more cooperative international player, perhaps under different management.



The 5,060 centrifuges is a far higher figure than the administration originally envisioned, when it argued that Iran could possess only a few hundred. But in the final negotiations, Mr. Moniz and his Iranian counterpart, Ali Akbar Salehi, the M.I.T.-educated head of Iran’s atomic energy agency, agreed that Iran would drastically cut its stockpile of nuclear fuel, from about eight tons to a little over 600 pounds. The giant underground enrichment site at Fordo, which Israeli and some American officials fear is impervious to bombing, would be partly converted to advanced nuclear research and the production of medical isotopes. About two thirds of its centrifuges would be removed. Eventually, foreign scientists would be present. It would have no fissile material that could be used to make a bomb.

 Olli Heinonen of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard... [and] the former chief inspector of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said, “It appears to be a fairly comprehensive deal with most important parameters.” But he cautioned that “Iran maintains enrichment capacity which will be beyond its near-term needs.”

December 3, 2014

DEMOCRATS NEED TO COME TOGETHER



Michael Tomasky, Daily Beast

So this is something that starts happening in an incumbent president’s sixth year, especially after an electoral walloping like the one the Democrats just absorbed: The fissures start to show. Because the president is becoming a lame duck and minds are turning naturally toward the next presidential election, the moment is now for the heavyweights in the party to start defining it in post-Obama terms. And the big fight the Democrats are starting to have, and need to have, is about how to put themselves squarely on the side of the broad middle class.

Of course, to someone who sees the world the way I do, it’s comically pathetic that there’s even a competition here. The Republicans are the party of the 1 percent. Oh, maybe the 5 percent on a good day. But really the 1 percent. No—actually really, the .01 percent. That more people can’t see this is, ah, well, a whole ’nother column really.

But in fact I think most people do see it—they just don’t mind it that much anymore. This is because 1) after 30 years of trickle-down agitprop, they’ve come to accept that what’s good for their bosses is good for them (because most people don’t know, for example, that U.S. wages haven’t really grown in those 30 years while for their bosses it’s been a party practically without rival in recent human history), and 2) most folks would simply rather blame poor people for their problems because doing so requires a lot less connecting of dots and is thus a more comforting narrative for them.

This is the crucial point that Democrats often don’t get. Democrats and liberals are inclined to say to themselves things like “if only most Americans knew X”—X being, say, that George Bush’s or Mitt Romney’s tax plan overwhelmingly benefits the rich—“why, we’d have ’em on our side.” But most Americans do know that, in their bones anyway. And they mind it, a little, but they don’t mind it as much as some of what they see from the Democrats.

Here, my conservative Beast colleague Lloyd Green is not entirely wrong to argue as he did Monday that a lot of middle-class people look at the two major domestic-policy matters the Democrats have placed before them—the Affordable Care Act and Obama’s executive order on immigration—and see a party that is more interested in helping poor people, and even illegally arrived poor people, than it is in serving them.

The Affordable Care Act was always a short-term political loser with respect to middle-class voters. Most of them have insurance, and only a small percentage face catastrophic illness. And you can explain why the individual mandate is a necessary leg of the three-legged stool until you’re purple in the face and it won’t get through to most voters. If it survives, it may start paying political dividends in a decade or so, when people have gotten used to it and it has increased the amount and type of preventive care insurance companies offer and made us a healthier society. It was the right thing to do for these and other reasons, but I don’t think anyone, including Obama himself, thought it would be a big political winner in his era.

Ditto the immigration executive order. True, a solid majority backs the Democratic position on the substance. But the recent batch of polls shows Americans to be, what else, deeply split on whether Obama was right to do this by fiat. (I’d love to know the percentage of Americans who are actually aware that the House could have spared us all this by passing the bill the Senate passed, which the country supports roughly two-to-one, at any point in the past 18 months; it’s surely single digits.) So Obama is not getting pummeled on this one so far, but he’s not winning it either. Again, the right thing to do, by my lights, but something that will be seen by the broader middle class as not really benefiting them.

In the coming months and up into 2016, Republicans will make sure these two programs stay front and center, because they of course know all this, and they’ll want to paint the Democrats as only looking out for “those people.” So the Democrats, as Chuck Schumer put it in his big speech last week, have to show the middle class that the party is firmly on its side.



The problem is that the Democrats are more divided on the “how” of doing this than they are on any other single question. At least that’s what we’re told. But are they, really? So much is made of the Elizabeth Warren Wing vs. the centrists (they don’t have a figurehead who can equal Warren in stature). And sure, there are differences. Trade is probably the biggest one, and the issue puts Democratic interest groups at each other’s throats, although regular voters don’t care much about trade policy. Whether to attack the deficit is another, but the deficit is going down, and by the way most voters don’t care much about it either. Whether to give a little ground on entitlement reform is a third, and that admittedly is a big one that there is no way to finesse (except to raise the payroll tax cap, which is the most sensible approach and one the Democrats will come around to someday).

But on loads of economic issues, as Schumer suggested in his speech, virtually all Democrats agree—minimum wage, student loans, workplace rules, infrastructure, a tighter link between productivity and wages are just a few of the things that all Democrats agree on and that, with the partial exception of the minimum wage, would benefit huge majorities of voters.

I said “partial” because a higher minimum wage, often thought of as helpful only to those at the very bottom, would have ripple effects for workers higher up the wage chain. In fact, this is a terrific case in point for the way in which the war between the Democrats’ two economic wings can be greatly exaggerated. I have before me on my browser two recent studies on this question, one by the centrist Hamilton Project and the other by the more liberal Economic Policy Institute. Both give estimates of how many U.S. workers would benefit from an increase in the minimum wage.
Only about 3.3 million Americans (pdf)  earn the federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour or less. The Hamilton paper estimates that an increase would benefit as many as 35 million workers, while EPI puts that number at more like 28 million.

Here’s what I’d like to see. Now that Warren and centrist Mark Warner are both in the Democrats’ Senate leadership ranks, I think the two of them should sit down and hammer out a Warren-Warner Middle-Class Compact that consists of 10 or however many major points that they know they can get everyone from Bernie Sanders to Joe Manchin to agree on (and of course they also need to be confident that Hillary Clinton will agree to most of them). Warren makes one clearly recognizable gesture to the center, and the centrists make one recognizable gesture to the left. But they agree. They have the stature and the position and the power to do so. I don’t know if they’re friends, but they don’t seem to be enemies; Warren helped raise money for Warner this year.

Warren & Warner

The core problem in Washington is that many both in the center and on the left are just too emotionally committed to a narrative by which the other side’s prescriptions will bring about the certain apocalyptic destruction of the Democratic Party. Warren and Warner have the power to change that narrative. Their chance to do so starts now

November 24, 2014

CASUALTY OF WAR: Hagel Resigns Under Pressure

Yuri Gripas / Reuters


N.Y. TIMES

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel handed in his resignation under pressure on Monday, the first cabinet-level casualty of the collapse of President Obama’s Democratic majority in the Senate and the struggles of his national security team to respond to an onslaught of global crises.

Mr. Hagel’s aides had maintained in recent weeks that he expected to serve the full four years as defense secretary. His removal appears to be an effort by the White House to show that it is sensitive to critics who have pointed to stumbles in the government’s early response to several national security issues, including the Ebola crisis and the threat posed by the Islamic State.
 Mr. Hagel, who often struggled to articulate a clear viewpoint, was widely viewed as a passive defense secretary.
 
Mr. Hagel, a respected former senator who struck a friendship with Mr. Obama when they were both critics of the Iraq war from positions on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has nonetheless had trouble penetrating the tight team of former campaign aides and advisers who form Mr. Obama’s closely knit set of loyalists. Senior administration officials have characterized him as quiet during cabinet meetings; Mr. Hagel’s defenders said that he waited until he was alone with the president before sharing his views, the better to avoid leaks.
 
Whatever the case, Mr. Hagel struggled to fit in with Mr. Obama’s close circle and was viewed as never gaining traction in the administration after a bruising confirmation fight among his old Senate colleagues, during which he was criticized for seeming tentative in his responses to sharp questions.
He never really shed that pall after arriving at the Pentagon, and in the past few months he has largely ceded the stage to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, who officials said initially won the confidence of Mr. Obama with his recommendation of military action against the Islamic State.
 
In Mr. Hagel’s less than two years on the job, his detractors said he struggled to inspire confidence at the Pentagon in the manner of his predecessors, especially Robert M. Gates. But several of Mr. Obama’s top advisers over the past few months have also acknowledged privately that the president did not want another high-profile defense secretary in the mold of Mr. Gates, who went on to write a memoir of his years with Mr. Obama in which he sharply criticized the president. Mr. Hagel, they said, in many ways was exactly the kind of defense secretary whom the president, after battling the military during his first term, wanted.
 
Mr. Hagel, for his part, spent his time on the job largely carrying out Mr. Obama’s stated wishes on matters like bringing back American troops from Afghanistan and trimming the Pentagon budget, with little pushback. He did manage to inspire loyalty among enlisted soldiers and often seemed at his most confident when talking to troops or sharing wartime experiences as a Vietnam veteran.
But Mr. Hagel has often had problems articulating his thoughts — or administration policy — in an effective manner, and has sometimes left reporters struggling to describe what he has said in news conferences. In his side-by-side appearances with both General Dempsey and Secretary of State John Kerry, Mr. Hagel, a decorated Vietnam veteran and the first former enlisted combat soldier to be defense secretary, has often been upstaged.
He raised the ire of the White House in August as the administration was ramping up its strategy to fight the Islamic State, directly contradicting the president, who months before had likened the Sunni militant group to a junior varsity basketball squad. Mr. Hagel, facing reporters in his now-familiar role next to General Dempsey, called the Islamic State an “imminent threat to every interest we have,” adding, “This is beyond anything that we’ve seen.” White House officials later said they viewed those comments as unhelpful, although the administration still appears to be struggling to define just how large is the threat posed by the Islamic State.

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Kristoffer Tripplaar/picture-alliance/dpa/AP Images


ELIZABETH DREW, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS

Though Hagel and Obama thought quite alike and respected each other, Hagel was probably not cut out for the Obama administration, or for what it’s evolved into. Though Hagel had, and used, a direct line to Obama—calling in frustration after a larger meeting where he felt he hadn’t been listened to, and over time largely wasn’t, Obama wasn’t as welcoming of diverse voices as he’d first indicated he would be. Hagel was never one to blend quietly into the tapestry. He prided himself in being his own man, and he liked to talk about his opinions—to the press and the public as well as on the Senate floor. Hagel wasn’t destined to be a docile member of an administration over which the White House exercises the tightest control in memory—especially one in which policy was made by a small group in the White House headed by a remote president who doesn’t care for turbulence and who is capable of changing policy on a dime. In particular, defense policy has time and again lurched head-snappingly from firm decision to its reverse. Bit by bit, Hagel saw policy in the Middle East move in the opposite direction of what he’d understood was his assignment and on which he and the president had once agreed.

Susan Rice

Hagel particularly chafed at the White House’s governing style on national security policy. He believed—and in this he was far from alone within and outside the administration—that national security adviser Susan Rice is in over her head. And Rice’s admittedly abrasive style put off a large number of people. But she’s been close to the president from the days of the 2008 campaign, and that appears to be what matters most to him. Initiatives, and not just in security policy, would get clogged up at the White House in task forces to study them. The NSC, which was originally a modest-sized organization set up to coordinate among the relevant cabinet departments, has metastasized into a staff of about four hundred people and under the Obama administration actually makes foreign and defense policy. A cabinet office has traditionally been an august position (if somewhat faded)—being called “Mr. Secretary” or “Madame Secretary” counts for a lot in Washington, and defense is one of the top ones. The Obama White House’s famous “micro-management” of the Departments—treating Cabinet officers as junior assistants, sometimes the last to know of a change in policy, would particularly trouble a person of pride, not to mention one who has held elective office. Hagel made no secret of his frustration. .....[A] senior adviser said to me Monday evening: “If Hagel had agreed with the White House he wouldn’t have been fired.”

November 20, 2014

OBAMA CONFRONTS CONGRESS; HE ACTS ON IMMIGRATION



Read it at WhiteHouse.gov:

President Obama announced Thursday night that temporary legal status will be extended to millions of undocumented immigrants who meet certain criteria. The government will expand the 2012  Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, giving temporary legal status to undocumented immigrants born after 1981, brought to the U.S. before age 16 and 2010. Undocumented parents of U.S. citizen or legal resident children can apply for temporary legal status in 2015 if they are low-priority for deportation and can prove that they have lived in the U.S. for five years.

They will have to pass background checks and pay fees in return for protection from deportation and work permits. A White House document called “5 Things to Know About How President Obama’s Actions Impacts Undocumented Immigrants” notes that the president’s actions “increase the chances that anyone attempting to cross the border illegally today will be caught and then sent back.”

“I know some of the critics of this action call it amnesty,” Obama said in his address. “Well, it’s not. Amnesty is the immigration system we have today—millions of people who live here without paying their taxes or playing by the rules, while politicians use the issue to scare people and whip up votes at election time. That’s the real amnesty–leaving this broken system the way it is. Mass amnesty would be unfair. Mass deportation would be both impossible and contrary to our character. What I’m describing is accountability—a common sense, middle-ground approach: If you meet the criteria, you can come out of the shadows and get right with the law.”

N.Y. TIMES

President Obama chose confrontation over conciliation on Thursday as he asserted the powers of the Oval Office to reshape the nation’s immigration system and all but dared members of next year’s Republican-controlled Congress to reverse his actions on behalf of millions of immigrants.

In a 15-minute address from the East Room of the White House that sought to appeal to a nation’s compassion, Mr. Obama told Americans that deporting millions is “not who we are” and cited Scripture, saying, “We shall not oppress a stranger for we know the heart of a stranger — we were strangers once, too.”
The prime-time speech reflected Mr. Obama’s years of frustration with congressional gridlock and his desire to frame the last years of his presidency with far-reaching executive actions. His directive will shield up to five million people from deportation and allow many to work legally, although it offers no path to citizenship.

November 14, 2014

OBAMA





N.Y. TIMES, MICHIKO KAKUTANI

For his inaugural program this September as moderator of NBC’s “Meet the Press,” Chuck Todd landed a big guest: Barack Obama. If the president reads Mr. Todd’s new book “The Stranger,” it’s hard to imagine him wanting to return to the program anytime soon. The book delivers a stinging indictment of his presidency so far, one underscored by this week’s elections, which resulted in huge gains for Republicans and are widely seen as a repudiation of Mr. Obama and his policies. Mr. Todd dissects “the promise versus the reality of Obama” and concludes that he will be regarded, at least in the near future, as “a president whose potential wasn’t realized.”

The underlying problems Mr. Todd diagnoses ...include what critics see as Mr. Obama’s passive leadership and lack of managerial experience; his disdain for, but inability to change, politics as usual in Washington; and his reluctance to reach out to Congress and members of both parties to engage in the sort of forceful horse trading (like Lyndon B. Johnson’s) and dogged retail politics (like Bill Clinton’s) that might have helped forge more legislative deals and build public consensus.

Mr. Todd acknowledges the challenges the president faced entering office: a tottering economy, two wars inherited from the Bush administration, and an obstructionist Republican opposition. But he suggests that Mr. Obama was frequently his own worst enemy, allowing his temperamental inclinations (his detachment, his caution, his impatience with the often-irrational aspects of politics) to hobble the implementation of his vision of transformative change.
The overall picture that emerges here is that of a highly insular and centralized White House that is reluctant to listen to outside experts, prone to cutting cabinet members out of the loop and unable or unwilling to learn from its mistakes.
Though he writes in workmanlike, utilitarian prose, Mr. Todd, who is also NBC News political director, has grounded his arguments in hundreds of interviews with Washington sources and his intimate knowledge of how that city works or (more often, these days) fails to work. Many of his conclusions echo the reporting of other journalists (like James Mann and The New York Times’s Mark Landler) and observations made by former administration insiders (like the former defense secretaries Robert M. Gates and Leon E. Panetta).
In contrast to Bob Woodward with his I-am-a-tape-recorder approach, Mr. Todd does not shy away from analysis.
 
Of the president’s flip-flops on Syria — initially leaning toward limited military action (after concluding that President Bashar al-Assad’s forces had used chemical weapons against their own people) then deciding to back away and seek approval from Congress — Mr. Todd writes that here was one of the few times that many of his advisers “quickly and vociferously disagreed with their boss.” Mr. Obama announced his change of mind after taking a walk with his chief of staff, Denis R. McDonough, who, Mr. Todd notes, had also been one of the dwindling number of aides skeptical of arming the Syrian rebels.
 
Like Mr. Gates and Mr. Panetta, Mr. Todd points to this administration’s proclivity for trying to centralize decision making in the White House. He writes that as secretary of state, Hillary Rodham Clinton felt that Mr. Obama’s White House, in Mr. Todd’s words, “tended to micromanage American diplomacy to an extent unprecedented in previous administrations,” adding, “It’s one of the undertold stories” that “the Obama national security team sometimes treated Clinton almost as a figurehead, and they certainly drove policy and the agenda.”
 
As for the administration’s handling of the Arab Spring, Mr. Todd reports that Mr. Gates, Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Biden all believed — and were hoping — that Egypt’s longtime president, Hosni Mubarak, would survive the 2011 protests against him; they worried that without him the country could spiral “into the unknown.” But Mr. Obama, writes Mr. Todd, sided “with his younger staff” (including Mr. McDonough, Susan Rice, Samantha Power and Benjamin J. Rhodes) “over the more seasoned principals,” and told Mr.Mubarak that he needed to step down.Egypt would, in fact, begin to spiral downward: Last year, military officers removed the country’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi and suspended the constitution; its new leader, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has presided over a highly repressive regime, jailing political opponents and cracking down on dissidents (acts that in turn have threatened to radicalize civilians).

 Mr. Todd uses the roller-coaster story of the administration’s health care plan as a kind of window into both its ideals and dysfunction. He contends that as a candidate Mr. Obama pledged himself to speedy and concrete action on universal health care “almost on a whim,” needing a way, in an early 2007 speech, to differentiate himself from his Democratic primary opponents, Mrs. Clinton and John Edwards.
Although several top Obama aides like Rahm Emanuel cautioned against rushing into health care as the administration’s first big initiative (as opposed, say, to financial regulatory reform), the president decided to push ahead. The process would bog down in Congress and only barely squeak through after a nerve-racking year.
 
The rollout of health care reform would become a public fiasco when the site went live in October 2013 with systemic problems. For three years, outside advisers had been warning about technical challenges and the need for managerial accountability, Mr. Todd reports, but a self-absorbed White House allowed turf battles, politics and simple inertia to lead to continued delays. “Like some of the administration’s other missteps,” he writes, the website disaster, “was rooted in poor management, in this case not designating someone, anyone, to own implementation.”
 
The troubles with health care, combined with a cascade of other crises — the rise of the Islamic State, an increasingly chilly relationship with Vladimir V. Putin’s Russia and the Ebola epidemic in Africa — have further wounded the White House, creating the impression of a reactive, even flailing administration. Republicans racked up big wins in this week’s elections in no small part because of Mr. Obama’s growing unpopularity. (According to exit polls, nearly six out of 10 voters expressed negative feelings about his administration.)
 
Some of the dysfunction that came to be associated with Mr. Obama’s tenure, Mr. Todd says, “was forced upon” him, and “some of it came from him.”
“If a huge reason for the failure of Washington to get anything done is a focus on means instead of productive ends,” he writes, “Obama’s struggles came from his focus on ends to the exclusion of productive means.”
 
 
president obama
Photo: Sean Gallup/Getty

PAUL KRUGMAN, ROLLING STONE

When it comes to Barack Obama, I've always been out of sync. Back in 2008, when many liberals were wildly enthusiastic about his candidacy and his press was strongly favorable, I was skeptical. I worried that he was naive, that his talk about transcending the political divide was a dangerous illusion given the unyielding extremism of the modern American right. Furthermore, it seemed clear to me that, far from being the transformational figure his supporters imagined, he was rather conventional-minded: Even before taking office, he showed signs of paying far too much attention to what some of us would later take to calling Very Serious People, people who regarded cutting budget deficits and a willingness to slash Social Security as the very essence of political virtue.

And I wasn't wrong. Obama was indeed naive: He faced scorched-earth Republican opposition from Day One, and it took him years to start dealing with that opposition realistically. Furthermore, he came perilously close to doing terrible things to the U.S. safety net in pursuit of a budget Grand Bargain; we were saved from significant cuts to Social Security and a rise in the Medicare age only by Republican greed, the GOP's unwillingness to make even token concessions.

But now the shoe is on the other foot: Obama faces trash talk left, right and center – literally – and doesn't deserve it. Despite bitter opposition, despite having come close to self-inflicted disaster, Obama has emerged as one of the most consequential and, yes, successful presidents in American history. His health reform is imperfect but still a huge step forward – and it's working better than anyone expected. Financial reform fell far short of what should have happened, but it's much more effective than you'd think. Economic management has been half-crippled by Republican obstruction, but has nonetheless been much better than in other advanced countries. And environmental policy is starting to look like it could be a major legacy.

I'll go through those achievements shortly. First, however, let's take a moment to talk about the current wave of Obama-bashing. All Obama-bashing can be divided into three types. One, a constant of his time in office, is the onslaught from the right, which has never stopped portraying him as an Islamic atheist Marxist Kenyan. Nothing has changed on that front, and nothing will.

There's a different story on the left, where you now find a significant number of critics decrying Obama as, to quote Cornel West, someone who ''posed as a progressive and turned out to be counterfeit.'' They're outraged that Wall Street hasn't been punished, that income inequality remains so high, that ''neoliberal'' economic policies are still in place. All of this seems to rest on the belief that if only Obama had put his eloquence behind a radical economic agenda, he could somehow have gotten that agenda past all the political barriers that have con- strained even his much more modest efforts. It's hard to take such claims seriously.


Finally, there's the constant belittling of Obama from mainstream pundits and talking heads. Turn on cable news (although I wouldn't advise it) and you'll hear endless talk about a rudderless, stalled administration, maybe even about a failed presidency. Such talk is often buttressed by polls showing that Obama does, indeed, have an approval rating that is very low by historical standards.
But this bashing is misguided even in its own terms – and in any case, it's focused on the wrong thing. 
Yes, Obama has a low approval rating compared with earlier presidents. But there are a number of reasons to believe that presidential approval doesn't mean the same thing that it used to: There is much more party-sorting (in which Republicans never, ever have a good word for a Democratic president, and vice versa), the public is negative on politicians in general, and so on.
 
More important, however, polls – or even elections – are not the measure of a president. High office shouldn't be about putting points on the electoral scoreboard, it should be about changing the country for the better. Has Obama done that? Do his achievements look likely to endure? The answer to both questions is yes.
 
The enactment and implementation of the Affordable Care Act, a.k.a. Obamacare, has been a perils-of-Pauline experience. When an upset in the special election to replace Ted Kennedy cost Democrats their 60-vote Senate majority, health reform had to be rescued with fancy legislative footwork. Then it survived a Supreme Court challenge only thanks to a surprise display of conscience by John Roberts, who nonetheless opened a loophole that has allowed Republican-controlled states to deny coverage to millions of Americans. Then technical difficulties with the HealthCare.gov website seemed to threaten disaster. But here we are, most of the way through the first full year of reform's implementation, and it's working better than even the optimists expected.
We won't have the full data on 2014 until next year's census report, but multiple independent surveys show a sharp drop in the number of Americans without health insurance, probably around 10 million, a number certain to grow greatly over the next two years as more people realize that the program is available and penalties for failure to sign up increase.
It's true that the Affordable Care Act will still leave millions of people in America uninsured. For one thing, it was never intended to cover undocumented immigrants, who are counted in standard measures of the uninsured. Furthermore, millions of low-income Americans will slip into the loophole Roberts created: They were supposed to be covered by a federally funded expansion of Medicaid, but some states are blocking that expansion out of sheer spite. Finally, unlike Social Security and Medicare, for which almost everyone is automatically eligible, Obamacare requires beneficiaries to prove their eligibility for Medicaid or choose and then pay for a subsidized private plan. Inevitably, some people will fall through the cracks.
Still, Obamacare means a huge improvement in the quality of life for tens of millions of Americans – not just better care, but greater financial security. And even those who were already insured have gained both security and freedom, because they now have a guarantee of coverage if they lose or change jobs.
What about the costs? Here, too, the news is better than anyone expected. In 2014, premiums on the insurance policies offered through the Obamacare exchanges were well below those originally projected by the Congressional Budget Office, and the available data indicates a mix of modest increases and actual reductions for 2015 – which is very good in a sector where premiums normally increase five percent or more each year. More broadly, overall health spending has slowed substantially, with the cost-control features of the ACA probably deserving some of the credit.


You can still argue that single-payer would have covered more people at lower cost – in fact, I would. But that option wasn't on the table; only a system that appeased insurers and reassured the public that not too much would change was politically feasible. And it's working reasonably well: Competition among insurers who can no longer deny insurance to those who need it most is turning out to be pretty effective. This isn't the health care system you would have designed from scratch, or if you could ignore special-interest politics, but it's doing the job.
And this big improvement in American society is almost surely here to stay. The conservative health care nightmare – the one that led Republicans to go all-out against Bill Clinton's health plans in 1993 and Obamacare more recently – is that once health care for everyone, or almost everyone, has been put in place, it will be very hard to undo, because too many voters would have a stake in the system. That's exactly what is happening. Republicans are still going through the motions of attacking Obamacare, but the passion is gone. They're even offering mealymouthed assurances that people won't lose their new benefits. By the time Obama leaves office, there will be tens of millions of Americans who have benefited directly from health reform – and that will make it almost impossible to reverse. Health reform has made America a different, better place.


president obama
Photo: Susan Walsh/AP


FINANCIAL REFORM
Let's be clear: The financial crisis should have been followed by a drastic crackdown on Wall Street abuses, and it wasn't. No important figures have gone to jail; bad banks and other financial institutions, from Citigroup to Goldman, were bailed out with few strings attached; and there has been nothing like the wholesale restructuring and reining in of finance that took place in the 1930s. Obama bears a considerable part of the blame for this disappointing response. It was his Treasury secretary and his attorney general who chose to treat finance with kid gloves.
It's easy, however, to take this disappointment too far. You often hear Dodd- Frank, the financial-reform bill that Obama signed into law in 2010, dismissed as toothless and meaningless. It isn't. It may not prevent the next financial crisis, but there's a good chance that it will at least make future crises less severe and easier to deal with.
Dodd-Frank is a complicated piece of legislation, but let me single out three really important sections.

First, the law gives a special council the ability to designate ''systemically important financial institutions'' (SIFIs) – that is, institutions that could create a crisis if they were to fail – and place such institutions under extra scrutiny and regulation of things like the amount of capital they are required to maintain to cover possible losses. This provision has been derided as ineffectual or worse – during the 2012 presidential campaign, Mitt Romney claimed that by announcing that some firms were SIFIs, the government was effectively guaranteeing that they would be bailed out, which he called ''the biggest kiss that's been given to New York banks I've ever seen.''
But it's easy to prove that this is nonsense: Just look at how institutions behave when they're designated as SIFIs. Are they pleased, because they're now guaranteed? Not a chance. Instead, they're furious over the extra regulation, and in some cases fight bitterly to avoid being placed on the list. Right now, for example, MetLife is making an all-out effort to be kept off the SIFI list; this effort demonstrates that we're talking about real regulation here, and that financial interests don't like it.

Another key provision in Dodd-Frank is ''orderly liquidation authority,'' which gives the government the legal right to seize complex financial institutions in a crisis. This is a bigger deal than you might think. We have a well-established procedure for seizing ordinary banks that get in trouble and putting them into receivership; in fact, it happens all the time. But what do you do when something like Citigroup is on the edge, and its failure might have devastating consequences? Back in 2009, Joseph Stiglitz and yours truly, among others, wanted to temporarily nationalize one or two major financial players, for the same reasons the FDIC takes over failing banks, to keep the institutions running but avoid bailing out stockholders and management. We got a chance to make that case directly to the president. But we lost the argument, and one key reason was Treasury's claim that it lacked the necessary legal authority. I still think it could have found a way, but in any case that won't be an issue next time.

A third piece of Dodd-Frank is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. That's Elizabeth Warren's brainchild, an agency dedicated to protecting Americans against the predatory lending that has pushed so many into financial distress, and played an important role in the crisis. Warren's idea was that such a stand-alone agency would more effectively protect the public than agencies that were supposed to protect consumers, but saw their main job as propping up banks. And by all accounts the new agency is in fact doing much more to crack down on predatory practices than anything we used to see.
 
there's enough evidence even now to say that there's a reason Wall Street – which used to give an approximately equal share of money to both parties but now overwhelmingly supports Republicans – tried so hard to kill financial reform, and is still trying to emasculate Dodd-Frank. This may not be the full overhaul of finance we should have had, and it's not as major as health reform. But it's a lot better than nothing.

THE ECONOMY
Barack Obama might not have been elected president without the 2008 financial crisis; he certainly wouldn't have had the House majority and the brief filibuster-proof Senate majority that made health reform possible. So it's very disappointing that six years into his presidency, the U.S. economy is still a long way from being fully recovered.
Before we ask why, however, we should note that things could have been worse. In fact, in other times and places they have been worse. Make no mistake about it – the devastation wrought by the financial crisis was terrible, with real income falling 5.5 percent. But that's actually not as bad as the ''typical'' experience after financial crises: Even in advanced countries, the median post-crisis decline in per- capita real GDP is seven percent. Recovery has been slow: It took almost six years for the United States to regain pre-crisis average income. But that was actually a bit faster than the historical average.
Or compare our performance with that of the European Union. Unemployment in America rose to a horrifying 10 percent in 2009, but it has come down sharply in the past few years. It's true that some of the apparent improvement probably reflects discouraged workers dropping out, but there has been substantial real progress. Meanwhile, Europe has had barely any job recovery at all, and unemployment is still in double digits. Compared with our counterparts across the Atlantic, we haven't done too badly.
Did Obama's policies contribute to this less-awful performance? Yes, without question. You'd never know it listening to the talking heads, but there's overwhelming consensus among economists that the Obama stimulus plan helped mitigate the worst of the slump. For example, when a panel of economic experts was asked whether the U.S. unemployment rate was lower at the end of 2010 than it would have been without the stimulus, 82 percent said yes, only two percent said no.
Still, couldn't the U.S. economy have done a lot better? Of course. The original stimulus should have been both bigger and longer. And after Republicans won the House in 2010, U.S. policy took a sharp turn in the wrong direction. Not only did the stimulus fade out, but sequestration led to further steep cuts in federal spending, exactly the wrong thing to do in a still-depressed economy.
We can argue about how much Obama could have altered this literally depressing turn of events. He could have pushed for a larger, more extended stimulus, perhaps with provisions for extra aid that would have kicked in if unemployment stayed high. (This isn't 20-20 hindsight, because a number of economists, myself included, pleaded for more aggressive measures from the beginning.) He arguably let Republicans blackmail him over the debt ceiling in 2011, leading to the sequester.
 
The bottom line on Obama's economic policy should be that what he did helped the economy, and that while enormous economic and human damage has taken place on his watch, the United States coped with the financial crisis better than most countries facing comparable crises have managed. He should have done more and better, but the narrative that portrays his policies as a simple failure is all wrong.
While America remains an incredibly unequal society, and we haven't seen anything like the New Deal's efforts to narrow income gaps, Obama has done more to limit inequality than he gets credit for. The rich are paying higher taxes, thanks to the partial expiration of the Bush tax cuts and the special taxes on high incomes that help pay for Obamacare; the Congressional Budget Office estimates the average tax rate of the top one percent at 33.6 percent in 2013, up from 28.1 percent in 2008. Meanwhile, the financial aid in Obamacare – expanded Medicaid, subsidies to help lower-income households pay insurance premiums – goes disproportionately to less-well-off Americans. When conservatives accuse Obama of redistributing income, they're not completely wrong – and liberals should give him credit.

Illustration by Victor Juhasz

NATIONAL SECURITY

So far, i've been talking about Obama's positive achievements, which have been much bigger than his critics understand. I do, however, need to address one area that has left some early Obama supporters bitterly disappointed: his record on national security policy. Let's face it – many of his original enthusiasts favored him so strongly over Hillary Clinton because she supported the Iraq War and he didn't. They hoped he would hold the people who took us to war on false pretenses accountable, that he would transform American foreign policy, and that he would drastically curb the reach of the national security state.

None of that happened. Obama's team, as far as we can tell, never even considered going after the deceptions that took us to Baghdad, perhaps because they believed that this would play very badly at a time of financial crisis. On overall foreign policy, Obama has been essentially a normal post-Vietnam president, reluctant to commit U.S. ground troops and eager to extract them from ongoing commitments, but quite willing to bomb people considered threatening to U.S. interests. And he has defended the prerogatives of the NSA and the surveillance state in general.

What I would say is that even if Obama is just an ordinary president on national security issues, that's a huge improvement over what came before and what we would have had if John McCain or Mitt Romney had won. It's hard to get excited about a policy of not going to war gratuitously, but it's a big deal compared with the alternative.
 



President Barack Obama
Alex Wong/Getty


SOCIAL CHANGE
In 2004, social issues, along with national security, were cudgels the right used to bludgeon liberals – I like to say that Bush won re-election by posing as America's defender against gay married terrorists. Ten years later, and the scene is transformed: Democrats have turned these social issues – especially women's rights – against Republicans; gay marriage has been widely legalized with approval or at least indifference from the wider public. We have, in a remarkably short stretch of time, become a notably more tolerant, open-minded nation. Barack Obama has been more a follower than a leader on these issues. But he has been willing to follow the country's new open-mindedness.
As you can see, there's a theme running through each of the areas of domestic policy I've covered. In each case, Obama delivered less than his supporters wanted, less than the country arguably deserved, but more than his current detractors acknowledge. The extent of his partial success ranges from the pretty good to the not-so-bad to the ugly. Health reform looks pretty good, especially in historical perspective – remember, even Social Security, in its original FDR version, only covered around half the workforce. Financial reform is, I'd argue, not so bad – it's not the second coming of Glass-Steagall, but there's a lot more protection against runaway finance than anyone except angry Wall Streeters seems to realize. Economic policy wasn't enough to avoid a very ugly period of high unemployment, but Obama did at least mitigate the worst.
And as far as climate policy goes, there's reason for hope, but we'll have to see.
Am I damning with faint praise? Not at all. This is what a successful presidency looks like. No president gets to do everything his supporters expected him to. FDR left behind a reformed nation, but one in which the wealthy retained a lot of power and privilege. On the other side, for all his anti-government rhetoric, Reagan left the core institutions of the New Deal and the Great Society in place. I don't care about the fact that Obama hasn't lived up to the golden dreams of 2008, and I care even less about his approval rating. I do care that he has, when all is said and done, achieved a lot. That is, as Joe Biden didn't quite say, a big deal.



DAILY BEAST


 
 
 


 











October 30, 2014

How Can Dems Be Losing to These Idiots?






MICHAEL TOMASKY, DAILY BEAST


.... it just amazes me. [The Democrats] are running against a party that is as intellectually dishonest and bankrupt and just plain old willfully stupid as a political party can possibly be, and they have developed no language for communicating that to voters.
I mean it is truly admirable, in its perverse way, how anti-idea this party is. It has no economic plans. Did you see this Times article last week called “Economists See Limited Gains in G.O.P. Plan”? I trust that you understand the world of newspaper euphemism enough to know that “limited gains” basically means “jack shit.” It’s all tax cuts and fracking and the wildly overhyped (in jobs terms (PDF)) Keystone pipeline.

 Of course, there are a few actual ideas they do have, like the Ryan Budget, but those are deep-sixed at campaign time, because the Republicans know that it would indeed force seniors to pay more out-of-pocket for their Medicare—I mean, as far as Paul Ryan is concerned, that’s the point!—and they’d much sooner not have to answer such questions at election time.
So they’ve got nothing. Not on the economy. Not on immigration reform. Not on health care—ah, health care. Think back with me now. In the first half of this year, there were a lot of news stories that got pumped out through Speaker John Boehner’s office about the Republicans working on a plan to replace Obamacare. Oh, it’s coming along, he said in summer. And the media scribbled down stories: Lookout, Obama! Republicans coming with alternative proposal!


Well, try Googling it now. You won’t find a word. They have no intention of “replacing” Obamacare with anything, and they never did. It was just something they knew they had to say for a while to sound responsible in Beltway land. Oh and by the way, that celebrated House lawsuit against Obamacare—remember that one, announced back in June? It turns out they haven’t even filed it! How empty can you get? Even their smoke and mirrors is smoke and mirrors.

John Boehner and House Republicans are pictured. | Getty
Getty Images
 ------

I could go on, but you follow me. The GOP has absolutely nothing of substance to say to the American people, on any topic. The Republicans’ great triumph of this election season is their gains among women, which have happened because (mirabile dictu!) they’ve managed to make it through the campaign (so far) without any of their candidates asserting that rape is the will of God. All these extremists who may be about to win Senate seats are winning them basically by saying opponent, opponent, opponent, Obama, Obama, Obama.
And the Democrats can’t beat these guys? This should not be hard. But it is hard. Why? There’s the “who votes” question. There’s money, especially the outside dark money I wrote about last week. And there’s the GOP skill at pushing the right fear buttons. And there’s the fact that the president happens to be, well, you know.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton President Barack Obama State Department headquarters
PHOTO: Matthew Cavanaugh-Pool/Getty Images

 But the underlying reason is this: The Democrats don’t have the right words for attacking the Republicans’ core essence and putting Republican candidates on the defensive. When Republicans attack Democrats, the attacks quite often go right to the heart of Democratic essence, and philosophy. “My opponent is a big-government, big-spending, high-taxing” etc. That gets it all in there in a few short words. Every Republican says it, and the fact is that it’s typically at least sort of true, because Democrats do believe in government and spending and taxes.

As a result, in almost every American election, the Democrat is instantly put on the defensive, while the Republican is playing offense. Of course that’s going to be truer in a sixth-year election of an incumbent Democratic president. But it’s usually more true than not. The Democrat, who is for things, who wants to do things besides cut budgets and taxes, carries the burden of explaining why those things will be good.

In fairness to the Democrats, they’re a little boxed in, because they can’t respond to the above attack by saying, “Well, my opponent is a small-government, low-spending, low-taxing” etc., which wouldn’t sound like much of an attack to most people.

So what they have to do instead is find a way to talk about this policy bankruptcy and duplicity of the GOP that I describe above, the party’s essential anti-idea-ness, because it’s through that bankruptcy and duplicity that the Republican Party manages to conceal from voters its actual agenda, which is to slash regulations and taxes and let energy companies and megabanks and multinational corporations do whatever it is they wish to do. Most Americans may be for limited government and lower taxes, but they sure aren’t for that.

In my experience, Democrats seem kind of afraid to do this. Partly afraid of the Republicans, and partly afraid of the conglomerates (they seek campaign contributions from Citibank too). And maybe my suggested way isn’t the only way to do it.
But high-ranking Democrats collectively need to perform the following exercise. Sit down together in a room. Distribute index cards. Let each of them write down five adjectives they associate with the GOP, adjectives they not only believe themselves but hear from constituents. Because the crowd has wisdom that the individual does not, take those that get the most mentions and turn them into attack on the GOP’s essence that will put Republican candidates on the defensive. Maybe that’s when our campaigns will change.

[Esco fears the problem that comes after completing this exercise; when the Democrats discover the best accusations, turn them on the Rebooblicans, and find that the populace would still prefer limited government, low taxes and less regs. Esco believes Democrats would get more traction, especially in senate and presidential elections, by sticking to their bread-and-butter issues: playing the fear card; that Rebooblicans, no matter what they say, want to take you back to the turn of the century (the 19th century) by slashing and ultimately ending social security, medicare, medicaid, and if the Dems had a scrimption of courage, they would yell their support of Obamacare from the rooftops. Of course, in this country, in this year,  Democrats are, probably doomed to failure being as they are under a severe handicap as "the president happens to be, well, you know."]